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The pervasiveness of depression and related clinical problems,alongwith recenttheoretical advances inattribution theory, have prompted a myriad of researchers to investigate attributional models of these "problems in living" (e.g., Anderson & Amoult. 1985a , 1985b Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983;  Brodt& Zimbardo,1981;Michela, Peplau, & Weeks, 1982; Peplau, Russell, & Heim, 1979; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & V~1979; Teglasi & Hoffman, 1982) . A key construct in these models is attributional style (AS). This individual difference construct refers to the systematic ways in which pe0-ple explain their own successes and failures. The basic idea is that people differ in their AS, and that AS differences contribute to inotiwtional. performance, and a.ffectiye reactions to various life experiences. The undue qrtimism apparent in much early work has moderated recently, and has been replaced occasionally by equally unwarranted~,imism.
To be sure, there arc scho1ars who continue to act as if the current attribution models of depression arc complete, accurate, and in no need of further testiDg. For the most part, boweYer, a bcalthy skepticism has ell1erJOd and prompted useful questions that previously were ignored, repressed, or avoided.
Questions concerniDa the proper causal dimensions to assess, attribution scale construction, methodological issues in AS tests of dimensional validity, predictive validity, and practicality of We think the foUowina iDdividuais for their comments on an earlier of this article: Roy Baumeister, Sandra Car1)eDter, and Lee Friedman. We also thank tWOanonymous reviewers for their unusually useful comments.
Correspoodence CODCerDinathis article should be addres8ed to Crail A. ADdersoo. Department of P\IycI:IokIIy,UniYersity of Miaouri. Co-IUJD bia, Missouri 6 S 2 11. Amoult. 1985a Amoult. , 1985b Anderson et aI., 1983; Coyne &:Gotlib, 1983; Feather & TIggemann, 1984; Russell, 1982; Weiner, 1985; Wimer & Kelley, 1982; Wortman & Dintzer, 1978) . We feel that much work is needed on all these questions, but that there arc several more pressing issues warranting attention. These issues are (a) is AS a valid construct? (b) is a person's AS acnerai across
.types of situations, specific to types of situations, or so idiosyncratically specific to particular situations as to render it inwlid as an individual difference construc:t? (c) does AS haYe important effects in complex social settings, or do situational influences render it impotent? These issues haYe been raised most often in the context of studies using Seligman's Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Seligman et aI., 1979) . This is due quite simply to the popularity of the ASQ and the reformulated learned beIp1es&. ness model from which it derives (Abramson. Selipnan. &:'leas. dale, 1978) . For example, Cutrona, Russell, and Jones (1984) raised a number of issues and used two data sets baed on the ASQ to address the issues. They found only weak evidence of a cross-situationaIly consistent AS, quite smaIl correlations with depression, and little evidence that ASQ scores predict people's attributions for real negative e'mlts in their JM:s. Their basic conclusions were (a) the concept of AS may not be a valid trait conception, (b) it must be more narrowly defined, and (c) perhaps a more situational orientation to uodetstaDdiDg attributional processes for specific e'mlts is needed.
Our goal in this article is not to defend the ASQ; its proponents arc both responsible for and capable of doing that themselves (e.g., Metalsky, Halberstadt, &: Abramson, 1987; Peterson & Seligman, 1984) . Indeed, we agree with many of the criticisms and sugestions of Cutrona et aI. (1984) and others (e.g.,
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C. ANDERSON, D. JENNINGs, AND L. ARNOULT Feather & TIggemann, 1984) concerning development and refinement of the AS concept in general. Rather, we present old and new data relevant to several general issues raised about AS primarily on the basis of different versions of the Attributional Style Assessment Test (ASAT) originally developed by Anderson et al. (1983) .
We focus on this limited set of studies for several reasons. First, the ASQ has been subjected to numerous reviews and a recent meta-analysis, so further review of the ASQ is unnecessary (Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986) . Second, the ASAT scales were specifically designed to distinguish between ASs for different types of situations. and have been administered along with measures of several different types of problems in living (i.e., depression, shyness, and loneliness) that theoretically should show differential relations with the different measures of AS. This allows a better examination of convergent and dis. criminant validity issues than is usually the case with ASQ studies of depression. Third and perhaps most important, reviews of the ASQ are likely somewhat biased by reporting and publication biases. That is, studies that "work" are more likely to be submitted and accepted for publication than are failures. Thus, it is hard to know whether or to what extent the reviewed findings are accurate reflections of reality (but see Sweeney et al., 1986 , for evidence that this bias did not distort their findings). By pooling the results from all of our studies using various versions of the ASAT, we minimize such reporting and publication biases. Finally, we have two studies in which the effects of ASs can be compared with the effects of corresponding attribution manipulations in complex social situations. Thus, we can roughly estimate the importance of these two sources of attributions. Before examining the ASAT data we turn to a brief dis. cussion of the issues to be addressed.
VALIDITY OF ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE
There are many different meanings of validity that may be addressed, the most important including construct, convergent, and discriminant validity. Essentially, construct validity means that a measure actually measures the theoretical construct it is supposed to measure. To demonstrate construct validity one needs to demonstrate that the measure correlates with other measures (such as scales or behavioral indexes) with which it theoretically should correlate. This is known as convergent validity. In addition, one needs to show that the measure does not correlate with other measures with which it theoretically should not correlate. This is known as discriminant validity. Straightforward but somewhat elaborate procedures have been established for assessing these types of validity. The most common is the multitrait-multimethod matrix procedure of Campbell and FISke (1959) . Construct validity may also be tested experimentally. If experimental manipulations produce theoretically expected changes in a measure, those results support the claim that the measure has construct validity (Nunnally, 1978) .
The construct validity of the AS concept has not been rigorously tested. Our data were not specifically generated to examine construct validity issues comprehensively. Howevet; we have assessed several conceptually distinct ASs in two Quite different ways. We have also looked at the intercorrelations of AS measures and have examined AS correlations with several measures of different problems in living that should relate to AS in slightly different ways. Finally, we have looked at how ASs measured in two different ways relate to complex social behave iors in two different settings. Thus, our data do address the va. lidity issues raised earlier. It is also important to note that OUr analyses include all the data we have gathered concerning these issues (both published and unpublished), so that the reporting and publication biases usually present in our field are Quite reduced here.
In sum, the studies presented provide good tests of conver. gent validity, some indication (but admittedly insufficient) of discriminant validity, and thus some evidence of the construCt validity.
SPECIFICITY VERSUS GENERALITY OF ATTRIBUTIONAL STYLE
An important theoretical and empirical distinction concerns the AS construct's specificity versus generality. At the most gen. erallevel, one could hypothesize that a person's AS is consistent across all possible situations. This view maintains that regard. less of the type of situation (e.g., interpersonal vs. noninterpersonal), individuals' relative standings on some attribution mea. sure will remain constant.
As pointed out by Cutrona et al. (1984) and others, the pre. vailing view of AS is that it is Quite general. That is, a person's AS is assumed to be totally cross.situationally consistent. Evidence in support of this assumption would consist of high cor. relations between attributions for very different types of situa. tions and similar validity coefficients for ASs assessed for very different types of situations. This is implied by the standard ASQ procedure of collapsing AS scores across the affiliation and achievement items before correlating with measures of depression (e.g., Seligman et al., 1979) . In addition, Seligman has reported (personal communication, 1979 ) that the AS correlations with depression do not differ for achievement versus affiliation items in either the successful or unsuccessful situations.
At a less general level, one could hypothesize that a person's AS is cross.situationally consistent only across situations that are similar in psychologically meaningful ways, but not across very diverse types of situations. This view maintains that within a situation type (e.g., interpersonal failures) the relau..e standing of individuals will remain fairly constant from one situation to anothet; but that between different situation types (e.g., interpersonal failure vs. noninterpersonal success) there will be little correspondence.
This view of AS as an individual difference construct at a moderate level of specificity demands that close attention be paid to a taxonomy of situation types. There are, of course, numerous ways of classifying situations. Therefore, finding a situation taxonomy that captures important AS differences may seem to be a formidable task. That task may be guided by theoretical and empirical considerations arising from analyses of the important problems to be linked to AS, such as depression, loneliness, and shyness.
Finally, at the most extreme level of specificity, one could hypothesize that people's relative standing on some attribution measure would show no consistency even within types of situa-981 nons. If this is true, then AS falls apart as an individual difference construct. and one is left with the position that attributions are totally idiosyncratically and situation ally determined.
As pointed' out in the preceding paragraph, the prevailing view of AS is that it is totally (or nearly totally) cross-situationally consistent. This view would seem to fly in the face of the voluminous literature showing that very few measured constructs are consistent across situations (e.g., Mischel, 1968) . Moreover, research from several attribution paradigms has yielded situational differences. The ftrst author has investigated the causal structure of different types of situations, that is, the extent to which the types of causes people consider as possibilities for a situation depends on the type of situation being considered. It has been shown that different types of situations do have different causal structures, and that the causal structure of situations is closely related to attributions made for the situations (Anderson, 1983a (Anderson, , 1985 .
Research on the concepts of depression and loneliness also .
demonstrates some situational specificity suggestive of the importance of distinguishing among different types of situations. For example, the loneliness prototype consists of exclusively interpersonal problems, whereas the depression prototype includes both interpersonal and noninterpersonal problems (Horowitz, French, & Anderson, 1982) . Furthermore, research from severa11aboratories has provided some evidence that AS is most appropriately assessed at an intermediate level of specificity (Anderson & Arnoult, 1985a , 1985b Anderson et al., 1983; Metalsky et al., 1987) .
Our current view is that fairly consistent ASs do exist at a moderate level of specificity (e.g., interpersonal failure situations). We also believe that the generality of ASs is most apparent (or most exaggerated) when assessed for hypothetical (but familiar) situations. In some sense, attributions in these cases are likely to be based on schematiclike judgments.
Consequently, even if AS is perfectly assessed (i.e., without error) we do not expect the intercorrelations of ASs for different types of situations to approach 1. In contrast, viewing AS as completely general across situations does lead to the prediction of perfect correlations, when corrections for the unreliability of the scales are applied. Similarly, we do not expect the crosssituation-type intercorrelations or the within-situation type reliabilities to be close to 0, as would be the case if there were no cross-situational consistencies in ASs. The studies presented include data allowing examination of all of these predictions.
If attributions influence complex social behaviors only when assessed at a very specific level. then such effects should be quite weak (or nonexistent) when assessed at an intermediate level.
That is, if AS is an invalid construct at an intermediate level, then using that intermediate-level construct should result in poor prediction of behavior, conversely, using a very specific attribution should result in a much better prediction ofbehavior. Our data also allow us to examine this version of the specificity issue.
ATIRIBUTIONAL STYLE AND SITUATIONAL EFFECTS ON SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
The final set of issues to be addressed concerns the effects of AS on consequential, complex social behaviors. Intimately tied --to this question is the issue of AS effect size relative to situational effects, and Person X Situation interactions. For some time it has been quite popular for social and personality researchers to bemoan the low percentage of variance explained by individual difference measures. The implicit assumption has been that situational variables do much better. More recently, the interactionist view has also become pop~with the explicit assumption that it is the interaction of situational and personality factors that accounts for the greatest portion of the variability in behavior (e.g., Bowers, 1973; Magnusson & Endler, 1977) . H~the empirical basis for the situationist and the interactionist positions is weak at best (see Funder & Ozer, 1983; Sarason, Smith, & Diener, 1975) . The percentage of variance accounted for by the situation and by the interaction is not any more impressive in general than the percentage accounted for by the person. (H~see Golding, 1977 , for a brief discussion of problems in assessing interactionist effects.)
In the attribution domain, there has been almost no research on the effects of AS on consequential social behaviors. Similarly, practically no attempt has been made to compare the effect size of AS and parallel situational attribution manipulations. Our position is that AS is a valid and influential construct. Further, we believe that when the situation under examination is prototypical (Schutte, Kenrick. & Sadalla, 1985) of the AS under in. vestigation, both AS and parallel attribution manipulations will affect complex social behaviors. We expect that when the attribution manipulation is pitted against AS in an unfamiliar (even though prototypic) setting, the manipulation will have relatively more impact. In general, h~we expect both to have important consequences for social behavior.
OVERVIEW
To examine these issues on the validity, specificity, and behavioral importance of AS we combined and reanalyzed all of our studies on AS. Four had been published previously in psychological journals in some form: two appeared in Anderson et al. (1983) , one in Anderson (1983b) ; and ODein Anderson and AInoult (1985b) . We included two additional studies: one a repli. cation of the Anderson and Arnoult (1985b) AS study of depression, loneliness, and shyness; the other Jennings's (1980) dissertation study of AS and attribution manipulation effects on responses to failure at interpersonal persuasion. Of the six studies, four were correlational ones relating ASs to clinical symt oms such as depression, loneliness, and shyness. The other two studies involved preselection of subjects on the basis of their ASs, manipulation of attributions, and observation of performance in interpersonal persuasion contexts. Most of the analyses in this article have not been reported previously and could not be derived from previously published work.
Correlation Studies

Method Description of Studies
Twoof the four correlation studies wereoriginally~in Ander. son et al. (1983) . In that article. the deYelopment of two versionsof the ASAT was reported, along with data examinina the relations between AS and depression and loneliness. For details about scale construction and the basic results, the reader should consult the original article. The main points are as follows. rU'St, a number of situations common to coil. students (the tarJet population) wen: described with success and failure outcomeS.
Pilot subjects wrote open-ended attributions to those situations as if they had been in them. A content analysis of the openended responses was conducted to derive a small number of fairly Pera! and inclusive types of attributions. The six resulting categories were strategy, ability, effort, personality trait, mood, and other circumstances.
On the basis of other pilot data, fi~situations rated as interpersonal and~rated as noninterpersonal were selected for inclusion in the ASAT. Each was presented in both a success and a failure form. Each of these 20 items had brief attributional statements included with it, one for each of the six categories listed in the preceding paragraph. Here is an example of an interpersonal failure item:
You have just attended a party for new students and failed to make any new friends. a. I used the wrong strategy to meet people. b. I am not good at meeting people at parties. c. I did not try hard to meet people. d. I do not have the personality traits necessary for meeting new people. e. I was not in the right mood for meeting new people. f. Other circumstances (people, situations, etc.) produced this outcome.
To complete the questionnaire, a person imagines himself or herself in each situation, then circles the cause that would best explain the stated outcome. This~on (ASAT-!) thus contains 20 items allowing assessment of ASs for four types of situations: interpersonal success and failure and noninterpersonal success and failure.
Although numerous attribution measures can be~from this instrument, we focus on a summary measure labeled apparent changeability by Anderson et al. (1983, p. 133) . This measure, now labeled controllability. was calculated for each situation type by combining the number of attributional choices, as foUows:
In essence, for each of the fi~items of each situation type, I is added to the controllability score if strategy or effort is chosen, I is subtracted if ability or trait is chosen. and 0 is added if mood or other is chosen. High scores thus indicate that the subject tends to select as attributions those factors that he or she can chanle, modify, or control. Low scores indicate a preference for factors that cannot be chan8ed, modified, or controUed. Note that aU four of these attributions are perally internal to the person.
The ASAT-I was administered to a 1aqe group of undergraduates, along with the Beck Depression In~tory (BDI; Beck &: Beck, 1972 ) and the UCLA Loneliness Scale (LS; Russell, Peplau. &: Ferguson, 1978) . Approximately 300 subjects completed these forms.
For the second study, a 36-item~on of the ASAT was used. In addition to the increase in items, the ASAT-II also differed in the attributional choices offered. Instead of the six described earliez; the ASAT-II included only ability, effort, and strategy choices. The measure of controUability (i.e., chanieability) was the negation of the number of ability choices, because the number of ability choices determines the number of strategy + effort choices. (The negation makes the direction comparable to the ASAT-I controllability index.) In this second study, approximately 120 undergraduate subjects completed the ASAT-II, the BDI' and the LS.
The third correlational study was originaUy reported in Anderson and Arnoult (l985b) . In that study, the rating scale format used in the ASQ was adapted to the 20 situations from the ASAT-!. That is, subjects Pcrated an open-ended attribution for each situation and rated their own attributions on each of several causal dimensions. The rated dimensiOlls included locus (internality), stability, and globa1ity, as in the ASQ. In addition, intentionality and controUability were rated to provide tests of several competing attributional models. This~on (ASAT-Ill) and modified measures of depression (MDI)' loneliness (MLS), and shyness (MSS) (see Anderson &: Harvey, 1988) were completed by 207 undergraduates. The major findingwasthat only the controUabilityand locus dimensions contributed significant unique increments to the prediction of depression, loneliness, and shyness. Therefore, we include here the results of the unit-weight tWO-dimension attributional styles (UWAS). computed as foUows:
For failure situatiollS, UW AS -control score -locus score.
For success situatiollS, UW AS -control score + locus score.
(2a) (2b) For failure, high UWAS scores indicate controUable and external attributions. For success, high UWAS scores indicate controUable and internal attributions. Note that the conclusions to be drawn later in this article do not change if the AS measure in the third and fourth studies included only the controUability dimension.
The fourth correlational study was a replication of the third, with a fourth~on of the ASAT (ASAT-IV). This~on was the same as the ASAT-III, except that 36 items (as in the ASAT-II) were used instead of 20. In this study, 206 undergraduates completed the ASAT-IV. the MDI' the MLS, and the MSS. Again, we include here only the composite AS results (i.e., the UWAS). This study has not been previously reported.
Analyses (I)
For aU analyses, the results of the forced-choice studies (ASAT-I and IIII and the rating scale studies (ASAT-III and V)V) were averaged separately, using the rto z weighted averaging procedure. We conducted four types of analyses. Fim, we computed reliabilities of the AS measures using Cronbach's alpha. If attributions are completely specific to each situation, then the re1iabilities should be about O. Second, we computed the intercorrelations of the AS measures for different types of situations. If AS is extremely idiosyncratic and not at aU cross-situationaUy c0nsis-tent, these correlations should essentiaUy be O. Third, we computed the intercorrelations of AS measures corrected for unreliability (Pedhazur, 1982) . If AS is~pera! across situations, these corrected intercorrelations should be perfect (I). Corrected intercorrelations of moderate size would suggest moderate specificity in AS, wbereas corrected intercorrelations near 0 would indicate that AS is specific to each of the four types of situations used. Fourth, we computed (and averaged across studies) the pattern of AS correlations with the clinical symptoms. These correlations provide further evidence regarding the convergent and discriminant validity of the AS construct.
Results and Discussion
Attributional
Style Interco"elations
The reliabilities, raw intercorrelations, and corrected intercorrelations of the AS measures for the four situation types are presented in Tables 1 and 2 .
The diagonals of Tables 1 and 2 contain the reliability estimates (alpha) of the AS measures. For both the forced-choice versions and the rating scale versions the reliabilities are modest, ranging from 151 to 6060These are about the same as for other AS measures (e.g., Cutrona et al., 1984) , and are sufficient for use in large sample studies. More crucial to our discussion is the fact that these moderate levels ofinternal consistency pro- Tables  1 and 2 . These correlations are uniformly positive and of small to moderate magnitude. All but one are significantly different from 0, demonstrating some cross-situational consistency.! That is, these results also suggest that AS is a valid construct at either a moderate or a general level; otherwise, the intercorrelations would have to be essentially O.
The raw intercorrelations discussed in the preceding paragraph give one a picture of the lower limit of the true relations among AS measures. To get a picture of the upper limit, we corrected these estimates using the reliabilities shown on the diagonals of Tables 1 and 2 . If AS is quite cross-situationally consistent, as has been assumed in the past, the corrected intercorrelations should approach unity. The corrected intercorrelations, presented below the diagonals, did increase in size but did not generally approach 1. This is in line with our moderate level of specificity hypothesis.
Additional comparisons of interest concern the relative magnitude of cross-situational consistency as a function of the similarity of the items in the different AS measures. The items differed on two dimensions, outcome (success or failure) and interpersonalness (interpersonal or noninterpersonal). Recall that each situation was presented twice, once as a success and once as a failure. Thus, to the extent that subjects perceived any demand to respond consistently, one might expect AS correlations that are based on the same situations (e.g., the success and failure versions of "attempting to cheer up your roommate") to be artificially inflated and relatively larger than other intercorrelations.
Psychologically, outcomes are powerful organizing themes. Thus, one might expect intercorrelations between same outcome AS measures (e.g., interpersonal failure and noninterpersonal failure) to be the highest. If subjects responded to each item accurately and without perceived consistency demands, then the same outcome correlations should be the highest; the same interpersonalness correlations and the correlations that were not the same on either should be about equal and somewhat lower. The results followed this latter predicted pattern exactly. The average intercorrelations for same outcome, same interpersonalness, and same on neither AS measure were 4040 7,7, and 4,4, respectively.
In sum, these data provide strong evidence that AS is crosssituation ally consistent when assessed at a moderate level of specificity. In addition, they provide some evidence of both convergent and divergent validity. The AS measures that should theoretically correlate the highest with each other did so; those that should correlate only weakly also did so as well.
Attributional Style Correlalions With Problems in Living
We conducted further examinations of the construct validity of AS by comparing correlations among AS measures and measures of depression, loneliness, and shyness. These correlations are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Theoretically, depression is less specifically tied to interpersonal situations than is loneliness or shyness. This is because depression contains both interpersonal and noninterpersonal features, whereas loneliness contains only interpersonal features (e.g., Horowitz et al., 1982) . We also assume shyness to be primarily interpersonal, but the relevant prototype analysis (comparable to Horowitz et al., 1982) has not been conducted.
Furthermore, because success is seldom disruptive regardless ofits perceived causes, we expected the interpersonal-noninterpersonal specificity of correlations with various problems in living to appear only (or more strongly) in failure settings. In short, we expected an interactionlike pattern of correlations among the problems in living and AS for failures. Specifically, within the failure situations the depression-AS correlations should be more equal across the interpersonal-noninterpersonal distinction than the loneliness and the shyness-AS correlations. Stated differently, the average of the loneliness and shyness correlations with interpersonal failure AS and the depression correlations .
with noninterpersonal failure AS should be stronger (i.e., more negative) than the average of the remaining failure AS-problems-in-living correlations. The results, as shown in Tables 3  and 4 , support this interaction prediction. Unfortunately, there are no established procedures for testing this prediction. We used a conserwtive procedure to get some idea of the reli-I All p levels are based on t\IIo-tailed tesU.
-- ability of the obtained interaction pattern. First, we transformed the correlations to z scores using the standard r-to-z transformation. The variance of such z scores is, of course, I divided by N. Now if each z were independent (i.e., based on separate subjects), then a linear combination of the zs such as would be used to test the interaction pattern would have as a variance the sum of the variances of the zs. Thus, to test the interaction pattern one would simply create a contrast reflecting the predicted pattern of correlations (zs) and divide by the square root of the sum of the variances. This is a Z test. For the results presented in Table 3 , ibistest would consist of summing the loneliness-interpersonal failure and the depression-noninterpersonal failure zs, and subtracting from this total the sum of the depression-interpersonal and loneliness-noninterpersonal failure zs. This contrast score would then be divided by the square root of 4 divided by 420. This same procedure could also be applied to the data in Table 4 , with appropriate contrasts applied to the shyness results included.
The obvious problem with this procedure is that the correlations (and the zs) were not independent. The effect of nonindependence in this situation is to reduce the error variance. That is. the variance of a linear combination of nonindependent parameters is the sum of the variances (as in the preceding paragraph) minus the covariances. We were unable to compute the amount of covariance to be subtracted in this rather unusual circumstance, so nothing was subtracted. Thus, to the extent that the correlations within Table 3 and Table 4 are not independent. the procedure outlined in the preceding paragraph results in too large an estimate of error variance and too small an estimate of the Z test statistic. In fact. the variables involved are all intercorrelated at a fairly high level, guaranteeing that our procedure produces O\Ierlyconservative results.
Nonetheless, we used this procedure to test our interaction prediction that within failure situations, the depression-AS relations would be more equal across the interpersonal-noninterpersonal distinction than would the loneliness and shyness-AS relations. This was done independently for the data in Tables 3  and 4 . Finally, we combined the results of these two separate tests using a chi-square procedure suggested by Winer ( 1971 ) . Even this conservative procedure resulted in a reliable confirmation of our prediction, x2(4) = 12.79,p < 3.3.
In addition to this overall interaction analysis, we conducted a series of t tests for differences between correlated correlations, based on our averaged data in Tables I through 4 with the large number of tests involved), we found that the de. pression correlations with interpersonal and noninterpersonal failure AS were not different in either the forced-choice or the rating scale versions, but that the same comparisons for loneliness and shyness were all significantly different. all ts~2.70, ps < 0000. In essence, tests of the construct validity of our moderately specific AS constructs were supportive. Two qualifiers to these claims are warranted here. First, note that in Table 3 loneliness did correlate reliably with noninterpersonal failure AS. Second, note that in Table 3 the AS-depression correlation was slightly (although nonsigniftcantly) smaller for noninterpersonal failure than for interpersonal failure. Thus, although the preceding significance tests of differences between correlations support both the convergent and~t validity claims for AS, the pattern is not perfect. Although we cannot be sure of the reason for these discrepancies, we have a suspect. Both discrepancies came from studies in which the measures of loneliness and depression had not been modified to eliminate confounding items. Anderson and Harvey (1988) have shown that several items on these scales have higher factor loadings on the other construct (i.e., higher loading on depression for a loneliness item, and higher loading on ,loneliness for a depression item). The results in Table 4 were based on measures of depression, loneliness, and shyness modified to be as factorially pure as possible; there were no anomalies in those results.
Finally, one very striking difference between the forcedchoice and rating scale results emerged. Success AS measures were uniformly predictive of problems in living when the rating scale method was used, but were uniformly unpredictive when the forced-choice method was used. Perhaps the limited choices available in the forced choice ASATs were simply too limited in scope and thus insensitive to success AS differences. This possibility and others warrant further work. .
Further refinements in measurement techniques are certainly desirable, as are more sophisticated studies of the validity and specificity of the AS constructs. It is clear nonetheless that AS assessed at moderate levels of specificity is a valid construct (actually, set of constructs) showing both convergent and discriminant validity. We turn now to our tinal question concerning the effects of AS and attribution manipulations on complex social behaviors.
Studies of Complex Social Behaviors
A second approach to the questions concerning the validity and utility of our view of AS is to assess the impact of AS differ- sponses to hypothetical situations of the same type (Le., interpersonal failure) as the target task situation. In both experiments, the preselected groups had controllable versus uncontrollable AS for interpersonal' failures. Prior to performing the target task, some subjects received attribution manipulations paralleling the preselection differences. If AS is cross-situationally consistent (at a moderate level of specificity, at least), then the AS factor should have important effects on performance at the target task. Specifically, those with a controllable AS for interpersonal failure should respond more adaptively to initial failures on the target task. Adaptive responding to interpersonal persuasion failures (the target task) includes maintaining high success expectancies and high motivation, making strategic changes to improve performance, and actually improving the persuasion performance. These effects of AS should be paralleled by comparable effects of the parallel attribution manipulations (AMs). Finally, we expected that AS effects would be of an important magnitude. Specifically, we expected AS effects to be about as large as the parallel effects of AM .
The first study we considered was Jennings (1980) . This study has not been published previously, and so the method is presented in considerable detail. Note that our analyses are somewhat different than those originally conducted by Jennings. Jennings (1980) Method Subjects. The subjects were 32 male and 28 female undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology. For their participation, they received either $3.00 or credit toward a class rcqu.iremeuL Thirty of these subjects (17 men and 13 women) were randomly assianed to the AM conditions.
The remaining 30 subjects (IS men and IS women) were recruited and assigned to the AS conditions on the basis of their responses to an item embedded in a large questionnaire completed 1 month prior to the study. This item had students imagine themselves giving an important talk in front of an audience that reacts negatively. Subjects were to specify the major cause for this failure. Subjects then used 7-point scales to rate the locus (external or internal) and the stability (unstable or stable) of the cause. From this pool of respondents, tWOgroups of I S students ----" each were recruited. One group had rated the cause as uncontrollable (defined as intcmal and stable); the second had rated the cause as controUable (defined as intcmal and unstable).
Procedure. On arrival, each subject was presented with a brief introduction to a study on persuasion techniques beiDa conducted by the Red Cross in preparation for an upcoming blood donor drive on campus. Specifical1y, each subject was told that the Red Cross was planning to conduct a radio campaign on campus in which student volunteers were to make short pitches on the campus radio station attempting to persuade their peers, to donate blood. The experimenter explained that past radio campaigns had not been as effective as the Red Cross would like: Although some volunteers were successful in JCtting a large number of pcqJle to donate blood, others were unsuccessfu1 in getting anyone to donate.
Attribution manipu/QJion. In both conditions, the experimenter first said, "We're conducting this experiment because no one in the Red Cross rca1ly knows why some volunteers arc more successful than others." At this point, the type of attributions primed for subjects in the AM conditions were manipulated. The experimenter commented that in the opinion of a Red Cross staff member, persuading pcqJle to donate blood is a task in which either abilities (uncontrollable condition) or strategies (controlJable condition) determine a volunteer's success or failure.
For the subjects in the AS conditions, the experimenter made no attempt to influence subjects' attributions for failure. He merely indicated that "We're conducting this experiment because no one in the Red Cross rcally knows why some volunteers are more successful than others."~rcc:a1lthat these subjects had been selected for their preexisting tcDciency to attribute failure at a simiJar communication task to either uncontrollable or controllable factors. Thus, these predispositions should have produced a difference in attributions that parallels the difference in the AM conditions.
Pemuz.sion task. In all conditions, the experimenter then explained that a radio campaign was being simulated in order to discow:r what factors infiuence a person's success or failure at persuading others OYer the radio to donate blood. The experimenter indicated that the subject would have three presentation~nities in the experiment, and that the subject would have S !Din immediately prior to each presentation to prepare. The experimenter explained that be would provide the subject with presentation etrectMnCSS fecdbll:k on each of the trials. A different expert judae was to listen to each presentation broadcast on a 1oudspeaker in an adjoining room (in order to simulate a radio broadcast) and then estimate the pcrcentqe of students that might donate if they beard the presentation OYerthe radio. The experimenter emphasized that each judae would hear and evaluate only one of the subject's presentations. ThUS, each evaluation was independent of the others. The experimenter then gaye the subject information about the blood dona-tion procedure, and told the subject to prepare for the first persuasive attempt.
Failure mIllIipullllion. During the experiment, each subject made a total of three presentations. About 1 min after each of these presentations, a voice OYerthe intercom indicated that the subject's presentation was weak and would have failed to persuade even 30% (supposedly an average level of effectMness) of students to donate. Although subjects were led to believe that each voice belonged to a different expert judge in an adjoining room, the voices were actually tape-recorded statements heard by all subjects. This procedure guaranteed that all subjects received identical feedback that was in no way contingent on their actual performance.
Measures of straJegy use and change. To determine whether subjects' attributions affected the actual content of their persuasive attempts, each presentation was recorded and later rated by three independent jud8es (one graduate and two undergraduate psychology majors) who were blind to the experimental condition of the subjects.
Jud8es were given a list of 14 persuasive tactics and strategies and asked to indicate which one(s) each subject used on each presentation. These strategies were using direct commands or direct requests; repeating previous arguments; emphasizing the personal benefits, ease and safety, or fun of donating blood; inducing f~guilt, duty and obligation, compassion. or pride; claiming personal expertise; using peer pressure; and emphasizing the critical shortaae of blood These strategies were either power strategies described by Falbo ( 1977) or strategies that subjects mentioned in a postexperimental questionnaire that asked them to list "all the strategies and tactics you could have used to persuade students to donate blood" A subject was given credit for using a strategy only if at least two of the three judges independently checked it.
Self-raJings of preparedness and success expectancy. To determine if subjects' attributions affected their predictions of success, subjects were asked to predict how effective their next presentation would be. Specitically, immediately prior to giving each presentation, subjects were asked to predict the percentqe of students that their presentation would successfully persuade if it were to be broadcast OYerthe radio. This may be regarded as a measure of perceived preparedness.
FoUowina the final presentation, subjects were asked to predict the percentqe of students they would successfully persuade OYerthe radio in an upcoming blood drive on campus, assuming they had a chance to practice. This may be regarded as a measure of future success expectancies.
PresenlaJiOfl effectiveness. Finally, to determine if subjects' attributioos affected the quality of their presentations, the jud8es rated the persuasive effectMness of each presentation. For subject's first presentation, jud8es estimated the initial level of effectiveness using a scale anchored at Not aJ all ejfectiw(coded as 1) and Exlremely ejfectiw (coded as 9). For subject's later presentations, jud8es estimated how much these initial levels had increased or decreased from the immediately preceding presentatioos using scales anchored at Much less ejfectiw ( 1) and Much more ejfectiw (9). The interjudge reliabilities as measured by Cronbach's alpha for the three presentatioos were 7,7, 4,4, and 6.6. The jud8es' ratiup were then ....uqed to form a single composite index of effectMness for each subject for each presentation.
Debriefing. After all depeodent measures had been obtained for a given subject, the experimenter asked a series of questions designed to assess the subject's suspicions regarding the various experimental manipulatioos and deceptioos used (Carlsmith. Ellsworth, &: Aronson, 1976) . No subjects detected that the jud8cs' evaluations during the experiment were actually prerecorded messages heard by all subjects, and no subjects guessed the hypotheses regarding the use and change of strategies foUowina failure. The experimenter then explained the true purpose of the experiment, concentrating on the impact the outcome manipulation might have had on the subjects' self-impressions. The "process debriefing" procedure (cf. Ross, Lepper. &: Hubbard, 1975) has proven effective in eliminating the persistent impact of false feed. back.
Results and Discussion
Three types of measures are of primary interest: success expectancies, strategy use, and performance quality. All dependent variables were assessed after the attributional sets or primes (AS or AM) were in operation. Each type of measure was assessed both before and after subjects' failure feedback. A series of 2 (attribution type: controllable Ys. uncontrollable) X 2 (attribution source: AS or AM) analyses of variance was conducted on these dependent variables and on derived composite scores.
Sw:cess expectancies. Before each presentation, subjects estimated the percentage of listeners who would be persuaded to donate blood (recall that they had been told to expect about a 30% success rate). On these measures of perceived preparedness for an immediate performance, there were no significant main or interaction effects, all Fs < 2.07, ps > 5.5. Subjects predicted mean success rates of 26.2%, 26.1 %, and 25.9%, respectively, for their first, second, and third presentations.
After all three presentations and failure feedback were completed, subjects were asked how successful they would be in an upcoming blood drive if they had a chance to practice. These future success expectancies were significantly influenced by attribution type. Subjects in the controllable conditions predicted a mean success rate of38.8%, whereas those in the uncontrollable conditions predicted a mean success rate of only 33.0%. This main effect was significant, £(1,56) = 5.06, p < 3.3. Neither the attribution source nor the interaction were significant, Fs < 1.
In sum, subjects in different conditions judged themselves to be equally prepared for the immediate task. However, those in the controllable conditions were more optimistic about their future performances than were those in the uncontrollable conditions, just as the attribution model predicts. In addition, there was no hint of an Attribution Source X Attribution 1YPe interaction, indicating that the effects of the two attribution sources (AS and AM) were of approximately equal size.
Strategy use. The number and type of strategies used in each presentation were assessed by raters blind to subjects' conditions. Two ideas are ofinterest here. FlISt, did the subjects' conditions influence the number or type of strategies selected for use in their first presentation? Given that the time for each commercial was tightly controlled, one might expect no differences in the number of strategies used; one must do something with that air time. Results indicated no systematic differences. Subjects used 2.9 strategies on average; there were no main or interaction effects, Fs < I. Furthermore, there were no significant differences in the proportion of subjects in the four conditions that used each of the 14 strategies examined by the judges.
Second, did subjects' conditions influence their tendencies to modify their strategies in subsequent presentations? The attribution model predicts such differences. If one thinks that performance quality is based on controllable factors such as strategy, one should be more willing to modify failed strategies (Anderson & Jennings, 1980) . To test this, we summed the number A1TRIBUTIONAL STYLE VALIDITY AND UTILITY 987 of strategic changes from first to second presentation, and from second to third presentation, for each subject. As predicted, controllable-condition subjects shifted strategies significantly more often than did uncontrollable-condition subjects (Ms = 3.4 and 1.5, respectively), F( 1, 56) = 10.19, p < 0000. Neither the main effect of attribution source nor the interaction were significant, Fs < I. In brief, both the AS and AM sources of attributions had powerful effects of approximately equal size on strategy shifts.
Performance effectiveness. Two questions are of primary interest here. First, to what extent did the attributional sets and primes influence the quality of the first presentations? A person who believes that performance quality on an upcoming task depends on controllable factors (such as strategy) will be more likely to consider the specifics of his or her presentation carefully than will one who believes performance quality is uncontrollable. Thus, one might expect quality differences to emerge early in the sequence of events. At the least, controllable subjects should be performing better than uncontrollable subjects by the third presentation. Thus, the second (and more critical) question is whether or not performance differences have emerged by the final presentation.
We examined the effectiveness ratings on the first presentation to answer the first question. Controllable-condition subjects did in fact produce better presentations than uncontrollable-condition subjects (Ms = 4.31 and 3.79, respectively), F(I, 56) = 5.92, p < 2.2. The main effect of attribution source and the interaction were both nonsignificant, Fs < I.
To assess the overall quality of the final presentations, we created a composite measure by summing the effectiveness ratings on first presentation with the change in effectiveness ratings on the second and third presentations. These overall performance scores yielded the same pattern as the first presentation data; there was a main effect of attribution type, £(1, 56) = 8.34, p < 1,1, but neither a main effect of attribution source nor an interaction, Fs < I. The attribution typC effect was that controllable condition subjects performed better than did uncontrollable-condition subjects.2
Composite index. To better illustrate the effects of AS and AM on subjects' reactions to this complex social situation, we created an overall index of future expectancies, strategy shifts, and performance effectiveness. We did this by computing z scores on each of these three measures and taking the average of the three as the index score for each subject. At a psycbologicallevel, this composite index is best thought of as an indication of how well people respond to the situation. Low scores indicate a withdrawal or depressive response, whereas high scores indicate an approach or optimistic response. At a statistical level, this index is essentially a multivariate dependent variable (as in a multivariate analysis of variance) with the specification that all three components be weighted equally.
The results are presented in Figure I . As can be seen, the attribution type main effect was quite strong, F( I, 56) = 26.54, p < 000000 I. That is, subjects in the controllable conditions responded better to the failure situation than did those in the uncontrollable conditions. The main effect of attribution source and the interaction were both nonsignificant, Fs < 1. In other words, both attribution sources (AS and AM) reliably affected responses in this situation, and did so to an approximately (Jennings, 1980) . equal extent. Indeed, AS had a slightly larger effect than did AM.
The Jennings (1980) study showed powerful effects of attribution type (controllable vs. uncontrollable) on a complex social behavior. Preselection based on attributions for one hypothetical situation I month prior to task engagement resulted in reliable attributional effects on success expectancies, strategy use during task performance, and quality of task performance. These same attribution type effects were produced by a subtle manipulation consisting of a casual statement made by the experimenter about possible causes of success and failure in the upcoming task. Of additional importance was the lack of any Attribution Source X Attribution Type interaction. Essentially, the attribution type effects of both attribution sources (AS and AM) were equal in size. Indeed, the direction of the trivial differences that did emerge suggests that AS bad a slightly greater impact. Thus, those who would abandon the individual difference approach because of the small amount of variance explained by such variables would also have to abandon the situational approach.
The second study to examine simultaneously AS and AM effects in complex social settings bas been previously reported (Anderson, 1983b) . It differed from Jennings's work in several important respects. rlI'St, preselection was based on a 5-item scale designed to measure controllability (changeability) AS for interpersonal failures in general, rather than on the basis of a single item that was very similar to the eventual task situation. Second. the AS assessment techniques were very different. Anderson's subjects responded to items in a forced-choice format (ASAT-I), whereas Jennings's (1980) subjects generated their own cause for the item and rated it on tWOcausal dimensions. Third, the subjects' tasks were quite different. In Anderson's study the task was to call people on the telephone and try to convince them to donate blood, whereas in Jennings's study subjects prepared and presented radio appeals. The major advantage of examining studies having these different features is that if similar results occurred in both studies, conclusions about attribution effects would be more generalizable and would be seen as contributing to the convergent validity of the AS construct.
One other difference to be noted concerns the design of the studies. In Jennings's (1980) study, subjects' attributions were based on either their AS or on the experimenter's manipulations. This allowed a simple test of which source had the greatest impact on subsequently assessed variables. H~it did not pit the two attribution sources against each other. Will AS override a situational manipulation of attributions, or vice versa? Assessment of this question was made possible in Anderson (1983b) by factorially crossing AS with parallel AMs. When the two sources are in conflict, three possible effects may occur. First, they may combine additively. Second, one source may completely dominate the other. Third. one source may dominate in one combination but not in another.
The goals of this study demanded a situation that had many features of difficult social situations commonly faced by college students, but also that was not a well-practiced one for most college students. The prototypicality of the situation should prime use of the desired AS, but its unfamiliarity should allow AMs to have some impact. The telephone solicitation situation seemed to have the desired features. Because subjects had never been in the situation before, we expected AM to override AS when in direct conflict. Otherwise, we expected AS to determine subjects' reactions to the situation.
Method
Colleae student subjects were preselected on the basis of their responses to the I.TI.T-I. Those scoring in the upper and lower thirds of the controlJability (chan8eability) index of AS fOl'interpersODal failure were asked to pirticipate; 63 aareed to do so. Participation in the study took place 5eYeI'alweeks to 5eYeI'almonths after the questionnaire had been returned. Subjects participated in an interpersonal persuasion study, which consisted of two sessions. In the first session, subjects were given information about telephone blood drives and then nmdomly assigned to one of three attribution manipulations. In the controllable conditions, the experimenter mentioned that stratqies 01'effort miaht be important determinants of success. In the uncontroDable conditions he mentioned ability and persoaality traits as possible determinants. In the no-manipulation conditions no mention was made of possible determinants of success and failure. Thus,. the design was a 2 X 3 (AS X AM) factorial. After the manipulation, subjects made a practice call (a riged failure), responded to a number of expectancy measures, and received a list of names to call during the following week prior to the second session. At the second session, data on subjects' success expectancies, motivation, and success rates were obtained. Because the results for these three types of measures were esaentialJy the same, we present here only an analysis of a composite index of the three measures. For more details, see Anderson (1983b) .
Results and Discussion
The results of the composite index are presented in FlgU1"e2. There are several points to note. First, AS had a significant effect on subjects in this complex social situation, as can be seen in the no-attribution-manipulationconditions,1(57)... 2.11, P < 5.5. Second. the AMs also had a significant effect, as shown by the contrast testing the difference between the AM controllable conditions (i.e., strategy or effort) and the AM uncontrollable conditions (i.e., ability or trait), 1(57) ... 2.84, P < 1.1. Third, AM completely overrode AS in this unfamiliar setting. Considering only the conditions in which attributions were manipulated, we found that the main effect of AS did not approach significance, 1(57) < 1.
H~these results do not mean that AS effects are so weak that they are unimportant determinants of social behavior. This interpretation is strongly contradicted by the results in the no-manipulation conditions.
A final test of the relative magnitude of AS and AM effects was to compare the mean controllable-uncontrollable differences in the no-manipulation conditions (the AS effect) with the corresponding differences in the four manipulation conditions (the AM effect). This specific contrast revealed that the effect sizes were not reliably different, 1(57) < 1. H~just as we found in Jennings's (1980) study, the mean effect of AS wasjust slightly larger than the AM effect, as is evident in FJgUre 2.
Pooled Analyses
We pooled the results of the Jennings (1980) and Anderson (1983b) studies by using the chi-square technique described by Winer ( 1971) . This involves combining the p levels associated with independent tests of the same hypothesis. The three main hypotheses concerned the effects of AS, the effects of parallel AM$, and the relative size of these tWOeffects. We used the composite indexes tram both studies (as presented in FIgUreS I and 2). The first test involved a comparison of the noomanipulated groups wh9 differed in AS. The second test involved a comparison of manipulated attribution groups (controllable vs. uncontrollable). Both the AS and the AM effects were highly significant, x~4)~18, ps < 0000. The third and most interesting test involved a comparison of the AS effect (in the absence of an AM) to the AM effect. This was nonsignificant in both studies independently; h~in both cases AS had slightly larger effects. Would the combination of the studies yield a significant difference in effect size? Results indicated that the effects of AS were not reliably different in size tram the AM effects, x~4) < 1. (Anderson, 1983b) .
CONCLUSIONS
Overall, the data presented in this article support a number of suggestions made previously in the literature, but contradict extreme positions for or against the AS construct. Attributional style does seem to be a valid construct. It shows both convergent and discriminant validity when assessed at a moderate level of specificity. The different ASAT measures were moderately intercorrelated and showed theoretically predicted variations in correlations with depression, loneliness, and shyness. The various ASAT measures of AS appeared sufficiently reliable to warrant future use in research settings, although improvements would benefit researchers and practitioners alike.
The forced-choice and rating scale versions showed remarkable similarities, both in the intercorrelations of various types of AS and in AS correlations with various problems in living. However; there were dramatic differences between the forcedchoice and rating scale versions in AS correlations with problems in living when usessed for success situations.
Finally, the effects of AS on complex social behaviors have been clearly demonstrated. Furthermore, the sizes of AS effects were at least as large as the effects of AM. This is not to say that preselection was not extreme (e.g., the t~and bottom thirds of the population were sampled, and the measure itself had modest intcmal reliabilities) and the manipulation was subtle (subjects simply heard the experimenter mention a particular type of cause that was of interest). Thus, although we recognize that the relative effect sizes can be pushed around a bit, we also believe that our conclusions concerning AS and AM effects are fair and accurate. manipulations cannot override AS effects; in the last study this is precisely what happened. Howev~in the absence of intentional situational manipulation, AS effects were clear and of a comparable magnitude. Thus, both the personality (Le., individual differences) and the social (i.e., situational) approaches contribute significantly to our understanding of these attributional phenomena.
In sum, AS does not appear to be as general or cross-situationally consistent as originally thought. Neither is it so situationally specific as to cease being a meaningful individual difference construct. Our guess that a distinction between interpersonal and noninterpersonal situations was needed proved to be correct. but there are many other ways to categorize situations that may be more valuable (e.g., Baumeister & Tice, 1985) . We feel that research on naturalistic situational taxonomies may help define the basic level of ASs needed. We also feel that more work on attributional effects in a variety of complex situations is needed, including in clinical and other applied settings. We hope others now feel such work is warranted.
